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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAN APPIS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case # 20000255-CA 
Priority # 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER CIRCUMSTANCES 
CONCERNING THE PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING SUCH 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The trial court's reasoning in sentencing Mr. Appis to 
prison was stated as follows: 
I'm impressed with the [Diagnostic 
Evaluation] report, that it's covered all 
of the necessary issues and that it's 
accurate- And that where the defendant 
takes issue with the report, that his 
position is incorrect. And . . . it's 
really a very thorough, well thought out 
and articulated report. I'm going to 
follow the recommendations. 
(Tr. at p. 11, see Addendum V, Brief of 
Appellant) 
This statement provides the entire basis for this 
court's determination of whether or not Mr. Appisf 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances were fully 
considered as required by statute. Yet the trial court's 
statement contains no reference to even one specific 
circumstance addressed by Mr. Appis, nor to any specific 
issues within the report (as conceded by the State in its 
responsive brief (Brief of Appellant, p. 11), the trial judge 
did not even mention the psychological evaluation conducted 
by a Department of Corrections licensed psychologist, which 
recommended inpatient treatment for Mr. Appis (Addendum IV, 
Brief of Appellant, p. 6; see Brief of Appellant at pp. 11-
12, 16-18). Thus, it is difficult to conclude that Mr. 
Appis1 circumstances were fully considered (See Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 4-12) 
The State, in its Appellee Brief, makes numerous 
references to information in the record which allegedly 
supports the trial court's sentence (Brief of Appellee at pp. 
5-7, 10-12, 14-15); however, none of this information was 
mentioned by the court itself. The State prefaces such 
information with phrases such as "factors...presented to the 
sentencing court..." (Id. at p. 5), "the evidence before the 
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court..." (Id. at p. 12), "perhaps the trial judge 
recognized,.." (Id. at p. 11) and "[t]he trial judge's 
remarks...implied his familiarity..." (Id. at p. 11). 
However, the mere fact that the court had access to certain 
information does not, in itself, show that such information 
was fully considered as required by Section 76-3-201(6)(e). 
In State v. Strunk:, 846 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically declined to make such an inference 
from the mere possession of information by the trial court. 
In that case, the mitigating factor of the defendant's youth 
not only had been presented to the trial court in various 
documentation, but also was visually apparent at trial. Yet 
the reviewing court refused to assume that this circumstance 
had been given full consideration, stating, "being aware of 
his age and taking it into account are not the same thing." 
In the absence of any mention by the trial court of this 
mitigating circumstance, the Supreme Court was unable to 
confirm that the sentencing had been "conducted with full 
information and with careful deliberation of all relevant 
factors," as required by the statute. (Id. at 1300; 
Appellee's Brief pp. 8-12). 
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In State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah App. 
1996), a case based upon the present statute, the State 
similarly argued that "[a] finding may be implied if it is 
clear from the record, and therefore apparent upon review, 
that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's 
decision," (quoting Adams b. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5 
(Utah App.:1991). The Utah Court of Appeals rejected this 
view and held that the trial court's failure to enter 
findings constituted plain error. See State v. Labrum, 925 
P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996). That court reached a similar 
result in State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 365, 371 (1996), noting 
that "findings of fact may not be inferred, but must clearly 
be made part of the record at sentencing . . . .[W]e will not 
merely imply what testimony might have persuaded the trial 
court . . . ." See also State v. Anderson, 979 P.2d 1114, 
1117 (Utah App. 1990)(holding judgment must be clear, written 
and definite). 
Similarly, in the present case, the fact that the trial 
judge had information available to him concerning aggravating 
and mitigating factors does not establish that such factors 
were fully and carefully considered. As noted above, the 
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trial court did not even mention the psychological evaluation 
conducted by a licensed psychologist for the Utah Department 
of Corrections, which recommended inpatient treatment for Mr. 
Appis1 "Borderline Personality Disorder" and substance abuse 
(Addendum IV, Brief of Appellant at p. 6) Nor did the court 
discuss Mr. Appis1 "moderate and nonviolent criminal record" 
(Diagnostic Evaluation Report,' Addendum III, Brief of 
Appellant at p. 8; see "Adult Record," Presentence 
Investigation Report, Addendum II, Brief of Appellant at p. 
4) nor his low score on the Criminal History Assessment 
attached to his Presentence Investigation Report ("Form 
l:Criminal History Assessment," Id. at p. 11), which placed 
him under the "Regular probation" category of the 
accompanying grid. 
In rejecting the above-recommended option of inpatient 
substance abuse treatment for Mr. Appis the court did not 
address Mr. Appis1 observation that his previous attempts at 
rehabilitation had been limited by the lack of individual 
counseling which might have increased their efficacy (Id. at 
p. 7; see Brief of Appellant, pp. 17-18). Nor did the court 
discuss the widespread unavailability of substance abuse 
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treatment program in the prison context. (See Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 14-15) In order to comply with Section 76— 
3-201(6)(e), the court should have given full consideration 
to such factors; yet no such consideration is shown by the 
record. As noted, the omission constituted an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the court. 
II. UTAH" CODE ANN. §76-3-201(6) (d) SHOULD GOVERN 
APPELLANT'S CASE AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO COMPLY THEREWITH, 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-201(6) (D) states that, "[t]he court 
shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term." The State 
asserts in its Appellee's Brief that the above section 
applied only to cases involving mandatory sentencing statutes 
and thus did not require compliance by the trial judge in the 
present case (Appellee's Brief at pp. 16-18). 
Although UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-201(6) (A) refers to sentences 
based upon mandatory sentencing statutes, §76-3-201(6)(D) and 
other subsections need not be limited to the mandatory 
sentencing context (Appellant's Brief, Addendum IV at p. 5). 
Rather, the individual subsections of §76-3-201(6 ) address 
various circumstances which may affect the length of a 
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sentence, only the first of which involves mandatory 
sentencing. For example, subsections (b) and (e) both 
discuss procedures relating to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, which may be considered in indeterminate 
sentencing as well as minimum sentencing. 
Although most of the cases interpreting the above 
statute have involved minimum mandatory sentencing, neither 
the title of this subsection, its structure, nor its express 
terms limit its application solely to the mandatory 
sentencing context.1 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the objectives of the 
foregoing statute in State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 
1988): 
With the requirements that the trial judge 
set forth on the record those facts and 
reasons which are mitigating or 
aggravating in nature and the reason for 
his choice of the particular sentence 
imposed, the statute provides an adequate 
basis both for guiding the trial court's 
discretion and for this Court to review 
the trial court's exercise of that 
discretion. 
*The statutory history of this section, as shown by annotations to the Utah Code, reveals that 
the provision in question was originally found in an earlier subsection which contained no 
reference to mandatory sentencing, yet required that the court make the reasons for its decision a 
part of the court record (See LdL "Notes, References and Annotations Amendment Notes.") 
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Both of the statutory purposes elucidated by the Bell 
court are served by the application of Utah Code Ann. §7 6-3-
201(6) (D) to indeterminate sentencing as well as minimum 
mandatory sentencing. By requiring a court record of the 
circumstances and considerations resulting in a particular 
sentence, the statute increases the care given to sentencing 
decisions and also ensures a proper -review of such decisions 
where appropriate. As discussed in Section I above, it is 
difficult to confirm the court's full information and careful 
deliberation "of all relevant factors" in the absence of any 
mention of such factors by the court. See also State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996); State v. Nelson, 725 
P.2d 1353, 1355-6 n.3 (Utah 1986)(holding written findings 
necessary in order for court to properly perform its 
appellate review function). 
Even in the absence of an explicit statutory 
requirement, the Utah Supreme Court has required lower 
courts, in certain contexts, to support orders of particular 
importance with a statement of supporting facts and reasons. 
For example, in State v. Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 
1080-1 (Utah 1985), the court imposed such a requirement in 
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connection with the process of juvenile certification for 
trial pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3A-25 (2) . Although the 
latter statute contains no explicit requirement of a 
statement of findings by the court, it does specify, like §76-
3-201(6)(E), that the court "shall consider" certain factors 
in reaching its decision. Because of this language, the 
court reasoned that a statement of reasons was necessary in 
order to ensure' that the statutory requirements had been 
met.2 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
In State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355-6 n.3 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court held written findings to be 
necessary prior to admission of out-of-court statements of 
child abuse victims, again in the absence of an explicit 
statutory requirement. The Court reasoned that, "Only when 
these steps are taken can a defendant be assured that the 
2
 The court instructed that such orders must contain the following: 
a sufficiently detailed statement of facts to permit us to 
determine that a full investigation has been made and that each of 
the statutory factors has been considered. In addition, we hold that 
the juvenile court must specify which statutory factors it has relied 
upon in deciding to certify, and it must explain why it thought 
those factors provided sufficient reason to justify certification. 
14 at p. 1081 
Applying these criteria, the Clatterbuck court found that the order under its review 
"rather than reflecting a thorough consideration of the facts in light of all the statutory factors, 
merely recite[s] reasons or conclusions framed in terms of some, but not all, of these factors." 
id* 
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statutorily required appraisal has been made. Further, only 
when such steps are taken can this Court properly perform its 
appellate review function." Accord State v. Eldredge, 773 
P.2d 29, 35-6 n.12 (Utah), cert, denied 493 U.S. 814 (1989); 
State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991); State v. Cook, 
881 P.2d 913, 915-6 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 890 P.2d 
1034 (Utah 1995). 
The State has advanced no policy reasons why the 
requirement of a statement of reasons should apply only to 
minimum mandatory sentencing. Although a sentencing court 
must exercise discretion in making a choice among mandatory 
sentences, similar discretion is required in choosing between 
an indeterminate prison term and parole with inpatient 
treatment, as in the present case. Nor is there more at 
stake for the defendant in the pronouncement of a minimum 
mandatory sentence, since either sentencing context 
potentially involves the loss of liberty for some period. In 
State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 1987), Chief Justice 
Hall noted as follows: 
The decision the statute required the 
trial court to make in imposing one of 
three alternative mandatory sentences did 
not differ from other decisions made daily 
on whether to impose indeterminate 
sentences, to suspend sentences, or to 
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place offenders on probation. 
Thus, as in Clatterbuck, due process requires that the 
court specify reasons for imposing an indeterminate sentence, 
including supporting facts and circumstances considered, even 
if §76-3-201(6)(D) is construed to apply only to minimum 
mandatory sentences. 
The]mere fact that the trial court possessed information 
concerning circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation of Mr. 
Appis' sentence does not establish that the court gave proper 
consideration to such circumstances, as required by §76-3-
201(6) (E). In order to demonstrate the careful consideration 
of all relevant factors and in keeping with §76-3-201(6) (D) , 
the court should have set forth supporting facts and reasons 
for its sentencing decision. Appellant respectfully submits 
that the court's failure to do so constituted abuse of 
discretion. 
DATED THIS 26th day of October, 2000. 
Happy J. Morgan 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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